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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. CUTLER ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

-vs.-

8163

DEJ AY STORES, INC., a foreign
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF

UASE~

r:rhe plaintiff brought this action to recover frmn the
defendant rental of and damages to leased pre1nises
which plaintiff claims is owing by the defendant on
account of a lease of property located at 36 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The lease is dated June 30, 1951 and contains, among
others the following provisions:
"'rhat in consideration of the covenants herein
contained on the part of the Lessee to be observed,
payed and perforllled, the lessor doth hereby
demise and lease unto the said lessee the ground
floor and basement of that certain building cmnmonly known as 36 South l\{ain Street, Salt Lake
1
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City, Utah, erected on the following
property, to-wit:

de~cribed

Commencing 32.84 feet North of the Southeast
corner of Lot 8, Block 76, Plat "A", S.L.C.
Survey; thence North 25.27 feet ; thence West
100 feet; thence South 25.27 feet; thence East
100 feet to place of beginning, together with
two rooms located upstairs in the rear of said
premises, approximately 20 x 40 feet, occupied
by former tenant as alteration room and office
. however, Bradley-Badger shall have'
excepbng
ordinary and usual right of egress and ingress
to elevator through North room, all in Salt Lake
City and County, State of Utah, said premises
to be used and occupied by the lessee continuously as a wearing apparel store during the
term hereof.
"'Yielding and paying rent, therefore, at the
rate of Five ( 5c;'o) percent of lessee's annual gross
sales, provided however, it is expressly agreed
that in no event shall a minimum rent of less than
FOUR Hl~NDRED ($400.00) DOLLARS per
uwnth to be paid to lessor. rrhe said Five ( 5%)
percent for the year 1951 to be paid lessor within
Thirty (30) days i1nmediately subsequent to
Decen1ber 1951. The said Five ( 5%) percent for
each succeeding year of the tern1 of this lease
shall be paid in cash within Thirty (30) days after
December 31, of each successive year of the term
hereof, but in no event shall the amount of rent
to be paid to lessor per month be less than a
1ninimum of FOUR HUNDRED ($400.00) DOLLARS, and it is agreed that the said lessee will
pay ~mch monthly minimmu rental of FOUR
HiTNDRJ~D ($400.00) DOLLARS in advance during the term hereof, beginning on the 1st day of

2
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August, 1951, and F,OUR HUNDRED ($400.~0)
DOLLARS on the first day of each successive
month thereafter during the tern1 hereof; except
lessee will pay upon the execution hereof the sum
of FOUR HUNDRED ($400.00) DOLLARS which
is a pay1nent on and toward the rent for the last
or final month of the term hereof; all rents to be
payable at the office of the said lessor in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
"Said rents whether due or to become due,
'
shall be a perpetual
lien on any and all goods,
wares and Inerchandise, and fixtures which may
at any time during the continuance of this lease
be contained in the premises, except such goods
and merchandise as are sold in the usual course of
retail trade ...
"that all ilnprovewents, betterments, changes,
additions, changes or alterations shall at the expiration of this lease be and remain with the said
premises and belong to the said lessor ...
"That the said lessee will not assign, underlet
or part with possession with the whole or any part
of the demised premises without first obtaining
the written consent of the lessor.
"That the said lessor, at all reasonable times,
may enter to view the said premises and to make
repairs which the lessor may see fit to make or to
show the premises to persons who may wii'h to
b~y and that during three months next preceeding
the expiration of the term it will pPrmit the lei':-;or,
if lessor so desires, to place and keep upon the
front of the building a notice that the 1)remises
are for rent or sale.
"That at the expiration of the said term the
lessee will peaceably yield up to }p:-;sor or t'ho:-;t~

3
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having its estate therein the pre1nises and all
additions 1nade upon the same in good repair in
all respects, reasonable use and wear and damages by fires or other unavoidable casualties
excepted, as the san1e now are or may be put during the term hereof.
"That no assent, express or implied by the
lessor to any breach of any of the lessee's covenants shall be deemed to be a waiver of any succeeding breach of the same covenant.
"It is further agreed that lessee shall pay any
costs, charges and reasonable attorney's fees that
may be incurred because of the default, nonperformance or violation of any provisions of this
lease agreement on the part of the lessee.
"If the said lessee shall give notice of its
desire to lease the said premises for an additional
period on or before the 1st day of August, 1955,
then and in that event, the said lessee shall have
the right of leasing the premises for an additional
period of Five ( 5) years upon the terms and conditions that are mutually agreed to by the parties
on or before the 1st day of August, 1956."
To the lease is attached two riders, one reading:
"The lessee shall have the right to sublet these
premises to any \\·holly owned corporation, providing it will remain responsible for the performance of all the term:s and conditions of this lease."
and

"Heat is to be supplied b~~ the landlords."

ThesP riders were consented to by the president of
the plaintiff corporation, but so far as appears, not by
tlw directors thereof (R. 5 to 11 and Exhibit P-1).

4
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While the lease does not expressly state the date of
its expiration, no reasonable conclusion is pennissible
other than it was to continue for a period of five years.
It will be noted that it is expressly provided in the lease
that if an additional period is desired, notice thereof
must be given before August 1, 1955 and that any new
lease must be executed on or before August 1, 1956, which
is five years after the beginning of the tjme that rent is
made payable on the lease here involved.
:Moreover, in light of the fact that the lessee went
to considerable expense to prepare the leased property
for occupancy and moved its fixtures and stock of goods
into the building and set up business therein, the only
reasonable construction that can be given to the lease
agreement is that a reasonable time was intended which
would make the period of the lease extend beyond the
time for which the plaintiff is seeking to recover rental.
Such view is further borne out by the evidence to which
we shall presently refer.
When the case was called for trial, the plaintiff was
granted leave to file a supplement and amendrnent to its
Complaint. By such supplement and amendment it i~
alleged:
"that the defendant is and at all tirnes herein
alleged has been a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.
That the defendant corporation is not authorized
and never has been authorized to do business in
the State of Utah." (R. 13)
5
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}.. t the trial it was ad1nitted by the defendant that
such allegation is true (Tr. 56 & 57). (The pages are
those of the Court reporter which will be used throughout
this brief.)
It is further alleged in the supple1nent and mnendment to the Cmnplaint that the plaintiff was c01npelled
to pay and did pay a c01nmission of $1725.00 for securing
a new tenant for the preinises (R. 13 and 14). The evidence shows without conflict that such is the fact, and
that the fee so paid is the usual and customary charge
(Tr. 18).
The evidence shows, without conflict, these additional
facts: That after the defendant began conducting its
business on the leased pre1nises, the amount of its business was not satisfactory and was not sufficient to require the payinent of rental in excess of the n1ini1nun1 of
$400.00 per month required to be paid Ly the tern1s of the
lease. Because of such fact, the defendant detennined to
vacate the pre1nises upon which it held a lease frmn the
plaintiff.
That on about February 13, 1952 a conference was
held by and between :Mr. Harold Cutler, the president of
the plaintiff corporation, and l\1:r. Cantor, the local manager of the defendant corporation, and :Mr. C. Frances
Solomon, Jr., a real estate broker, who at that time was
representing the defendant corporation, in an attempt
to secure someone satisfactory to the plaintiff corporation to take over the lease on the premises involved in
this litigation (Tr. 81-83). In that meeting, l\fr. Cutler

6
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was infonned that the defendant had purchased some
fixtures frorn the Salt Lake Knit which defendant wished
to remove to the new location, but that the defendant in
no way intended to discontinue recognizing its liability
to 1nake the pay1nents as provided for in its lease and
that :Mr. Cutler offered to cooperate in an attempt to get
a new lessee (Tr. 83-84).
That the witness l\lr. Solomon attmnpted to get
tenants to lease the property of the plaintiff at 36 South
1\Iain Street; that he received a written offer from
Wally's Flower Shop, the same being Exhibit 1, which
was received in evidence ( Tr. 85).
The offer of Wally's Flower Shop is dated l\Iarch
5, 1952 and by which, among other matters, one Wallace
Toma stated he would pay a rental of $400.00 per month,
commencing April1, 1952 and extending to .July 31, 1956
for the entire property to consist of the front retail store
together with the entire basement and a portion of a
building on Richards t;treet, which is connected to the
Main Street property by a bridge which now ha~ two
sets of washrooms. The offer of Mr. Toma is attached
to the deposition of Mr. Solomon.
Mr. Solomon received an offer frmn the Martha
Washington Candies of Utah whereby it offered to lease
for a period of four years at a monthly rental of $250.00
to begin when alterations have been completed and the
store room ready for occupancy. rt'he offer further provided "that the present front windows and present front
door is to be remodeled providing for a depth of approxi-

7
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rnately five feet back frmn the front property line, a lock
is to be provided on the front door of the romn to be
occupied hy us and is to be partitioned ready for decorating and a drop ceiling is to be installed. In addition to
the store romn, it is our understanding a small storage
romn will be provided in rear, together with one wash
roon1, including toilet and wash basin . . ." (See Def.
Exhibit ±, attached to the deposition of .Mr. Sol omen.)
By an instrument dated July 15, 1952, BradleyBadger C01npany, By Briant G. Badger, wrote to .JI r.
Sol01non as follows :
"We are desirous of securing space in the
Old Salt Lake Knit Location and are prepared to
offer $100.00 per nwnth for a portion of the
ground floor to be agreed upon, plus the basement
and the space at the rear including the over-pass.
We must ask, however, that you act upon this
offer within one week fron1 this date, and advise
us." (See Def. Ex. No. 2, attached to deposition
of l\ir. Solmnon.)
On July 16, 1952, Mr. Solornon received an offer
frorn one, r.r. L. Wakefield for and on behalf of the
Acousticon of Southern Illinois in which an offer was
ruade to lease one-half of the front store space, approxirnately fifty feet, for a rental of $250.00 per rnonth and
to begin when the alterations had been completed, and
he could occupy the premises. The offer further recites
that he understood the DeJ ay Stores Co. should take
care of and pay for the alterations and that the lease
should contain permission to sublet the premises. (See

8
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Ex. 3 attached to the deposition of Mr. C. Francis SoloInon.)
The plaintiff corporation did not accept the offer,
but indicated that they might approve a lease at $650.00
per month, but nothing was done about the counter offer,
except that Bradley-Badger Company stated that they
would increase their offer h,v $25.00 per month. The
plaintiff rejected the offer (Tr. 87 to 90). That Mr.
Solomon made no further offer on behalf of the defendant
to secure a lease of the pre1nises here involved.
That in the fall of 1952, the friends of Mr. Glade,
who was a candidate for :Mayor, occupied the premises
for 13 days and paid for the use thereof $130.00. That
the plaintiff was deprived of rent for ten months, less
the $130.00, before it was able to secure a satisfactory
tenant (Tr. 11). :Mr. Harold Cutler, president of plaintiff, testified that the defendant, without permission, took
out everything that could be removed, including a
good part of $1500.00 worth of alterations whieh was
put in by the Millard Construction Company. That the
alterations that were removed was nwstly shelving that
was nailed to the walls and the plaster was chipped out.
That there was about 6 or 8 mirrors re1noved from
around the posts (Tr. 12). That stain glass was removed
of the value of $250.00. The glass was in the balcony
at the back of the building (Tr. 14).
The witness was asked as to how much it cost to
have the work of repairing the interior of the building
done, to which an objection was made and sustained (Tr.
9
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14). That the witness sent to New York, Los Angeles,
and i\lissouri and put ads in the paper in an attempt to
get a ladies apparel store in the building. That he finally
secured the services o.f i\Ir. Solomon, a real estate broker,
to get smneone to lease the pren1ises and paid him $1,725.00 for his service, which is the usual and customary
commission." (Tr. 16-17).
That prior to the lease to the defendant, the premises
had been leased to Salt Lake Knitting Stores for about
ten years (Tr. 19). That the defendant purchased the
fixtures in the store frorn the Salt Lake Knit (Tr. 19-20).
Such fixtures are listed in Exhibit D-5, which was received in evidence.
i\Ir. Harold Cutler, the president of the plaintiff
cmnpany, further testified that he did not tell :Mr. Cantor
that the defendant rnight rernove the fixtures and merchandise fronr the prernises, but he said he would cooperate with the defendant (Tr. 21). That it was up to the defendant to get another tenant if they were to rnove out.
That the defendant uwved out between April20 and i\Iay
1, 1952 (Tr. 22). That the witness had a nun1ber of conferences with a Mr. Coularn about leasing the premises to
the Western Pacific Railroad Cornpany, but the parties
were unable to agree on the terms of the lease (Tr. 25-27).
Mr. Cutler further testified that the plaintiff did not say
that it would give a lease to Bradley-Badger, the Acousticon Cornpany of Illinois and :Martha Washington for
$650.00 per month. That at the tirne it was attempted to
get a new tenant for the premises it was estimated it
10
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would cost about $4000.00 to remodel the premises so that
they could be occupied by the three tenants, and the DeJay people said they would pay for such expense if a
lease were 1nade, but the plaintiff rejected the offer (Tr.
29).
On or about July 25, 1952, a notice, Exhibit D-2, was
served upon .Mr. Cutler by the Constable, who also gave
Mr. Cutler the keys to the building ('J.1r. 29-30). 11 hat the
witness placed "for rent" signs on the store after defendant moved out and pennitted a political organization to
occupy the pre1nises for a period of 1:3 days at $10.00
per day (Tr. 30). That it was so occupied in the latter
part of October and the first part of November. That
these acts were done without the consent of the defendant. That Exhibit D-3 is a fair picture of the premises
after the same were vacated including the notices "for
rent" in the windows (Tr. 31). ~rhe exhibit wa~ received
in evidence (Tr. 31).
In about February 1953, the witness received an offer
of $500.00 per month from the Utah Photo for rental of
the property, but the offer was rejected err. 32-33). 'rhe
defendant did the renovating and painting when it moved
it; the shelving was used to hold the merchandise; that
the light fixtures were suspended by a metal bar (Tr.
33). ~rhat the bars were not put in hy the defendant (Tr.
34). That the stained glass was in the premises when the
defendant moved in and were apparently put in hy the
Salt Lake Knit Company; that Bradley-Badger ston~d
some merchandise in the store, but no rent was paid by

11
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them ( Tr. 36). rrhat the plaintiff 'vas finally able to
negotiate a lease with the Bradley-Badger Company (Tr.
35). Their rent started on :May 1, 1953, but the~, were
given possession of the pre1nises on about l\:Iarch 1 to 15,
1953 in order to put the pre1nises in a condition for occupancy. They are paying $575.00 per nwnth (Tr. 36).
That Bradley-Badger stored only a sn1all anwunt of obsolete stuff on the pre1nises towards the back of the building during the last few 1nonths before they took a lease;
that the storage was temporary. It was in and out again,
and no charges were made (Tr. 37). rrhat the offers made
to rent the pren1ises were changed so often that he does
not recall of presenting all of them to the Board of Directors. That the three offers of ~Iartha Washington, et
al, were rejected because they were engaged in a different
line of business; that there would be two stores, and
Bradley-Badger taking the back part which would have
required another partition. There were several drawbacks to that (Tr. 38). That toilets would have to be put
in the basen1ent, that they would have to dig doorways
do·wn and put in steps and they were hollering at the expense they would have had there; that the defendant
was engaged in the business of selling ladies and men's
clothes, l\1artha vV ashington was in the candy business,
Bradley-Badger was in the appliance business and the
other concern was engaged in selling hearing aids. That
while the witness had several conversations with Mr.
Coulam, who represented the railroad cmnpany, they
were unable to agree on a lease (Tr. 39-40). That the
plaintiff was not willing to lease to the Japanese florist

12
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known as Wally'~ Flower Shop, because they were looking for the best deal they could make and the florist
would not n1ake any thing definite c:rr. -tO). The Utah
Photo also wanted three tenants in the building. That
the credit of the Photo people was not satisfactory c:rr.
-!1). Tha.t at first the key to the building was sent to
the witness by registered mail, but he refused to accept
it because he knew what it was, and later the key with
the notice was delivered to the witness by the constable
(Tr. 42-43). That the only notice the witness had that
the defendant would not be responsible for the payment
of the rent is that contained in the notice marked Exhibit
D-2 err. 43-4 7). That during the tirne the defendant was
occupying the premises at 36 South il1ain Street, BradleyBadger was a tenant of plaintiff's premises irnrnediately
to the north (Tr. -!5 ). That the renovations made by
Bradley-Badger were necessary in order to lease the
premises (Tr. 40-41).
illr. John C. Jenkins was called h:· the plaintiff and
testified that he is and at the time involved in this controversy was a director of the plaintiff corporation ( rrr.
46-47). That the defendant vacated the premises at 36
South Main Street about April19 or 20, 1952. r:l1 hat when
the defendant vacated the premises the plaster was torn
from the walls, there were holes in the linoleum; that the
walls would require plastering and redecorating, the
fixtures were torn entirely from the ceiling, leaving holes
therein (Tr. 49). That the plaintiff company was at all
times desirous of getting a ladies apparel shop as a lessee
of the premises owned by the plaintiff; it had been so
13
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used for the past 13 years and as a elothing store for the
past ±5 years before it was leased to Bradley-Badger (Tr.
51). That the reasons why the Board of Directors of
plaintiff corporation were not willing to accept the offers
rnade to lease the prernises were that they wished the
same to be let for a ladies apparel shov, some of the
offers were nmde by people who did not have sufficient
credit, and the Board of Directors did not want to divide
the building into several stores (Tr. 52). r:rhat as an accomnlodation to Bradley-Badger some furniture was
stored in the back of the building for a short time ( Tr.
53). That at no tirne did the plain tiff corn pany agree to
rent the premises to :l\lartha \Vashington Cand~,, et al for
a rental of $650.00 per month.
Harold Cutler was recalled and asked whether or not
he had a bid to repair the building after it wat-5 vacated,
to which question objection was made that it was incompetent, irrelevant, iunnaterial and hearsa)~ (Tr. 58-59).
The objection to the proffered evidence was sustained
on the ground that it is hearsa~'· The plaintiff offered
to show that it would cost $850.00 to rnake the necessary
repairs (Tr. 58-61). The foregoing sumn1ary is taken
frorn the testirnony of _l\lr. Solonwn, one of the defendant's witnesses and Harold Cutler, the president and
general manager of the plaintiff corporation who testified as plaintiff's witnesses. Nome of the testirnony of
John C. Jenkins is also abstracted. All of the material
facts are established by the evidence abstracted. ']~here
is no substantial eonflict in the evidence except that defendant offered evidence which tended to show that ~lr.
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Cutler consented to the defendant's vacating the premises
(Tr. 84) which Mr. Cutler denied (TL 11, 21 and 119).
The plantiff and appellant relies upon the following
points and errors for the relief which it seeks:

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASKED OF
HAROLD CUTLER, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PLAINTIFF
CORPORATION: DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH IT COST TO
HAVE THAT WORK DONE? WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF
THAT BID? (THE BID TO REPAIR THE BUILDING AFTER
IT WAS VA·CATED BY DEFENDANT.) (TR. 58-59)

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED AND TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID DEMISED PREMISES IN SEPTEMBER, 1952.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT AGREED TO REMAIN OBLIGATED TO
PAY THE RENT ON THE DEMISED PREMISES UNTIL A
NEW LEASE COULD BE SECURED.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AND FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF
$1725.00 AND INTEREST THEREON AT 6% PER ANNUM
FROM AND AFTER FEBRUARY 4, 1954, THAT BEING THE
AMOUNT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS COMPELLED TO PAY
AND DID PAY AS A REAL EST ATE BROKER'S COMMISSION TO GET A NEW TENANT FOR THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS LITIGATION (TR. 15-16).
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POINT FlYE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO A WARD PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL IN THE FOLLOWING
AMOUNTS: $3870.00, TOGETHER vVITH INTEREST AT 6%
PER ANNUM ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER JULY 1, 1952;
ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER AUGUST 1, 195'2; ON $400.00
FROM AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM
AND AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1952; ON $270.00 FROM AND
AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER
DECEMBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1953; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER FEBRUARY
1, 1953; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER MARCH 1, 1953;
ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER APRIL 1, 1953.

POINr_t, NIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR $600.00 AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
IN THIS ACTION.

ARGUl\fENT

Son1e of the errors toncerning which the plaintiff
and appellant complains are in part due to the fact that
the Court below failed to give effect to our statute relating to the results of a foreign c-orporation doing business
in this state, ·without being authorized to do so.
If we approach the question which plaintiff and appellant clai1n requires a judgment for substantial additional amounts against the defendant with such statutes
in n1ind, we believe considerable light will be shed upon
the questions presented for revie·w.
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U.C.A. 1~););~ 16-8-3 which was in effect at the time the
transactions here involved were had provides:

"Any foreign corporation doing business within this state and failing to C'Ompl~· with the provi~ions of Section 16-8-1 and 1 (i-~--~ shall not be entitled to the benefit of the law of this state relating to corporations, and shall not sue, prosecute
or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, ero;-;~
complaint or proceeding in an~· of the courts of
this state on any claim, interest, or demand arising or growing out of or founded on an~· tort occurring, or of any contract, agreement or transaction made or entered into, in this state hy such
corporation, or by its assignors or by any person
from, through, or under whom it derin·s its interest or title or any part thereof, and shall not
take, acquire, or hold title, possession or ownership of property, real, personal or mixe(l, within
this state; and even· contract, agrePlllent and
transaction whatsoever made or entered into hy or
on behalf of an:v such corporation within this state
or to be executed or performed within this state
shall be wholly void on behalf of :-:ueh corporation
and its assignees and PYer~- person deriving an)·
interest or title therefrom, hut shall be valid and
enforceable against such coqwration, assignee
and person; and any 1wrson acting as agent of a
foreign corporation which shall neglect or refuse
to comply with the foregoing provisions is guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall he personally-liable on
any and all contracts made in this state h:v him
for or on behalf of such enqwration during the
time that it shall he so in default; provided, that
this s0dion shall not IH~ held to apply to pPrsons
acting as agents for foreign corporations for a
special or temporar~- purpose, or for a purpose
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not within the ordinary business of such corporation, nor shall it apply to attorneys at law as
such."
The foregoing provision has been before the courts
of this state and has been construed by this court in the
following cases: Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. t:. Tulleride Power Transmission Co., 23 Utah 22; 63 Pac. 995
where it is held (under a law not nearly as rigid as the
present law) that a foreign corporation has no power to
engage in business in this state or to acquire any water
rights under the laws of this state, and is not in a position to question the rights of one who clahns such right.
In the case of Dunn v. Utah Serum Co., 65 Utah 527;
238 Pac. 245, it is held that a note and mortgage held by
a foreign corporation executed by a domestic corporation
to secure a loan made by a foreign corporation while the
foreign corporation was doing business in the state without complying with 16-8-1 was void and such foreign corporation could not set off amount of loan against rent
owing by it to domestic corporation.
In the case of First Nat'l. Ba-nk of Price v. Parker,
57 U. 290; 194 Pac. 661, it is held that a bona fide holder
for value without notice could not enforce a note payable
to bearer and delivered to a non-complying foreign corporation, notwithstanding provisions of negotiable instrument law.
In the case of Frwnldin Bldg. and Loan Co. v. Peppard, 97 U. 483; 93 Pac. 2( d) 925, it is held that a noncomplying foreign corporation could not impress any lien
18
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to recover taxes on propert:· upon which it held a mortgage.
\Ve shall presentl:· ha \'e occaswn to revert to the
principles of law announced in the foregoing ca~e~ in
connection with our argument in connection with the
aboYe enrunerated point;-;, r:L\n), Four, Wive and Six.
POINr:i1 OXE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS TO THE FOLLOvVING QUESTIONS ASKED OF
HAROLD CUTLER, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PLAINTIFF
CORPORATION: DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH IT COST TO
HAVE THAT WORK DONE? vVHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF
THAT BID? (THE BID TO REPAIR THE BUILDING AFTER
IT WAS VA·CATED BY DEFENDANT.) (TR. 58-59)

Harold G. Cutler \nt::; the President and General
~[anager of the plaintiff corporation and as such had
the supervision of the premises which were rented to the
defendant company (Tr. 8). After having testified to
the condition in which the walls of the premises were in
when the defendant vacated the premises, he wa1:1 asked
if he received a bid for the repairing of the building
to which he responded that he received one bid for the
painting. He was then asked "\Vhat was the extent,
amount of that bid~" Objection wa~ made to the questioning that it was incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial,
eliciting hearsay testimony ( Tr. 58). After some argument, the Court sustained the objection on the ground
that it i1:1 hearsay. Counsel for the plaintiff offered to
show that the bid was for $850.00. rrhe law relating to
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the n1anner of establishing the value of serviee is thus
stated in Jones Comrnentories of Evidence, 2 ed Vol. 2,
page 1325.
"The proper Inethod is to procure evidence
of the price which a c01npetent 1nan would charge
for that particular service or has charged for
si1nilar service."
N mnerous cases will be found collected in foot notes to
the text which support or tend to support the same.
A1nong such cases are: Warden et al v. Hutchim.son, 69
Cal. app. 291; 231 Pac. 563. Atlas Develop'ment Co. v.
National Security Co., 190 Cal. 329; 212 Pac. 196.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED AND TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID DEMISED PREMISES IN SEPTEMBER, 1952.

If it is Ineant by the foregoing finding that the plaintiff accepted the property free fr01n the obligation of the
defendant to pay the rent up to the time a satisfactory
new tenant could be obtained, then such a finding is
wholly without support in the evidence. Defendant's
evidence shows without conflict these facts: That when
the conversation was had between ~fr. Cutler, Mr. Cantor
and :Mr. Solon1on, who at the tin1e was representing the
defendant company, ":Mr. Cantor advised Mr. Cutler
that they (the defendant) in no way intended to discontinue recognizing their responsibility on the lease and
the pay1nents would be niade in accordance with the terms
of the lease. Mr. Cutler offered to cooperate in trying
20
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to help us (defendant) secure another tenant, and :Mr.
Cantor expressed the thought that our company would
have an opportunity of finding a new tenant for 3G South
1\lain Street." (Tr. 83)
"The conclusion of the visit that we had \Yas that it
was satisfactor~~ with the Cutler:::; for DeJ ay Stores to
move to the new location and ~\I r. Harold Cutler expressed a willingness to help us cooperate in seeing if we
could find another tenant, a sub-tenant, a sublease of
the property and I repeat that I had no impression that
DeJay Stores in any way considered that they were getting out of their lease; they had ever!r intention of taking
the responsibility of making the payments and so advised .Mr. Cutler." ( Tr. 84-85)
l\Ir. Cutler testified that at no time did the defendant corporation or any of its officers, except by this
notice (Exhibit D-2) ever tell (him) that thP). were
surrendering up possession of this property (Tr. 43).
He further testified that he did not tell ?\lr. Solomon and
~Ir. Cantor that the defendant could remove its merchandise and fixtures from the premises at 36 South
:\lain Street, but did say he \nmld cooperate with them

err. 21).
The evidence further shows that the defendant corporation first sent the key by registered nmil to ~I r.
Cutler, the president of the plaintiff eorporation, who
refused to accept the saine and later they had a constable
serve the notice (Exhibit D-2) aud the ke:~ upon ~I r.
Cutler Cl1 r. 29 and -t-:2). rrlms thl' evidence sho\Y~ without
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conflict that the defendant company abandoned the
premises and the plaintiff was compelled to take possession thereof to preserve the saine. If the pretnises were
not to be and remain va('ant, the plaintiff, of necessity,
was required to lease the same. It may be inquired what
else could the plaintiff do except take possession of the
property and lease the same~

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT AGREED TO REMAIN OBLIGATED TO
PAY THE RENT ON THE DEMISED PREMISES UNTIL A
NEW LEASE COULD BE SECURED.

We have heretofore in this brief directed the attention of the court to the testitnony of defendant's witness,
Mr. Solomon, who was etnployed by the defendant to
secure a new tenant for the pretnises which had been vacated by the defendant. His testiuwny upon that matter
will be found in the Tr. 81 and 84-85. All of the evidence
is of silnilar import.

POIN'l, FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AND FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF
$1725.00 AND INTEREST THEREON AT 6% PER ANNUM
FROM AND AFTER FEBRUARY 4, 1954, THAT BEING THE
AMOUNT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS COMPELLED TO PAY
AND DID PAY AS A REAL EST ATE BROKER'S COMMISSION TO GET A NE\V TENANT FOR THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS LITIGATION (TR. 15-16).
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r:rhe evidence as to the costs that the plaintiif was
put to in securing a new tenant is likewise without controversy. The amount paid was $1725.00, which was the
usual and reasonable amount charged for such services
(Tr. 16-17). The evidence further showt; that ~lr. Harold
Cutler atternpted to secure a lease from a tenant who
would use the premises for the operation of a clothing
store, but that he was not successful ( Tr. 15). r:rhere can
be no doubt but that the paynrent of the real estate <·oJnmission was made necessan· because the defendant abandoned the premises and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to reimbursernent for the money so expended unless
it should be held that the plaintiff was obligated to accept
one of the offers secured by the defendant agent to lease
the property. \Ye shall further discuss that phase of the
case under the next heading. The case of Ii11ckman 1;.
Bread ford, 178 Iowa 827; 162 N.,V. 63, lends support to
the clairn that plaintiff is entitled to a reimbursement for
this expense.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO A WARD PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR RENTAL IN THE FOLLOWING
AMOUNTS: $3870.00, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST AT 6%
PER ANNUM ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER JULY 1, 1952;
ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER AUGUST 1, 195'2; ON $400.00
FROM AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM
AND AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1952; ON $270.00 FROM AND
AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER
DECEl\IBER 1, 1952; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1953; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER FEBRUARY
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1, 1953; ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER MARCH 1, 1953;
ON $400.00 FROM AND AFTER APRIL 1, 1953.

It is apparent that the court below refused to give
the plaintiff judgment for the rental which it lost between
the 1st of October, 1952 and May 1, 1953, a period of
seven months, less the ten days that the pren1ises were
used for political purposes for :Mr. Glade, because of some
transaction had between the plaintiff and the defendant.
It will be seen from the language of U.C.A., 1953 16-8-3
heretofore quoted that "a non-complying corporation may
not successfully 1naintain any clailn, interest or demand
arising or growing out of or founded on any tort occurring or of any contract, agreement or transaction made
or entered into in this state . . . and every contract,
agreement, or transaction whatsoever made or entered into by or on behalf of such corporation within this state,
or to be executed or perfonned within this state shall be
wholly void on behalf of such corporation and its assigns
and every person deriving any interest or title therefrom
but shall be valid and enforceable against such corporation, etc."
In the case of Dunn v. Utah, etc., supra, it is said in
238 Pac. at page 251 that:
"Neither can this offending corporation prevail on the ground that the act of lending money
was not doing business and hence that contract
was not a valid transaction, nor upon the ground
that the contract by which the Inoney was lent was
fully performed before appellant began doing
business in this state, nor yet upon any implied
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contract or equitable grounds. The statute strikes
down every contract and transaction whatsoever
made or h~d within the state hy sueh corporation.
The language of Section D-1-7 (now with some
amendments \\~hich do not aid the defendant, Sec.
1G-S-i3 above quoted) includes all transactions
whatsoever, the first contract as \vell as the last,
in1plied contracts as \vell as those which are c>xpressed and excludes the idea that such a corporation may pick out any particular contract made
within the state and claim an~~ rights under or
sue upon it."
To the same effect see 93 Pac. ( :2d.)
B'll!ilding & Loarn Co. -c. Peppard, et al.

~):2;),

Franklin

The meaning of the word "tl·ansaction" a::; defined
by the courts is discussed in Words and Phrases, Yol. -l-:2,
pages 35G to 383. Arnong the numerous definitions there
collected from the adjudicated cases are:
'·rrransaction embraces every variety of affairs which conform to the subject of negotiations,
interviews, or action between the parties and includes every method by which one person can derive impressions or information from conduct,
condition or language from another."
International Shoe Co. r. Hawkinson, 10
N.W. (2d) 590, 593; 72 N.D. G22.
A transaction is something which has taken place
whereby a cause of action has arisen. 1t must, therefore,
consist of an act or agreement or several acts or agreements having some connection with each other in whieh
more than one person is concerned and hy which the
legal relation of such persons between themselves are
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altered. Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 2-! N.E. (2d) 228, 234;
302 Ill. A pp. 634.
A transaction is the formation, performance or discharge of a contract, the assignrnent of a right under a
contract, and also facts that would have amounted to any
of these if it were not for rnistake or s01ne wrongful act
of one of the parties. Restatentent Contracts, Sec. 470c.

There would seem to be no escape fronr the concl usion that the action of :Mr. Sol01non in atternpting to get
a new tenant for the plaintiff and the delivery of the key
to the property here involved, and the other acts relied
upon by the defendant as the basis of its claim to be relieved fronr paying rent up to the time Bradley-Badger
began paying rent were transactions. If they were not
transactions, it may be inquired, what were they~ If as
the statute provides, such transactions were void, it
necessarily follows that they could not serve to relieve
the defendant from its obligation under the lease.
If, as the case from this jurisdiction above cited hold,
a non-complying corporation may not enforce its contracts, for much stronger reasons rnay not such a corporation escape its obligations by such transactions as are
relied upon by it in this litigation.
Before leaving this phase of the case, we digress to
observe that the defendant has filed a cross appeal by
which we apprehend that it will seek to reverse that part
of the judgment. whereby the plaintiff was awarded a
judgrnent against the defendant for the smn of $300.00
26
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for damages to plaintiff's vremises. In this connection
we direct the attention of the court to those provisions
of U.C.A. 1953 16-8-3 wherein it is provided that a noncomplying corporation "shall not take, acquire or hold
title, possession or ownership of propert~,, real, personal
or mixed, within this state."
The evidence here shows that the defendant, without
the consent of the plaintiff, removed frmn the leased
premises property valued many times $300.00 ( Tr. 11 and
13). If effect is given to the foregoing language of our
statute, the plaintiff corporation was legally entitled to
retain all of the property that was removed l>y defendant
from the leased premises. l\foreover, even if the noncomplying defendant corporation had all the right of a
complying foreign corporation or a domestic corporation,
still the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief which
it claims.
It will be noted that the lease provides that '':-;aid
premises to be used and occupied hy the lessee continuously as a wearing apparel store during the term hereof." We know of no reason why, nor have we been able
to find any authority that the parties may not provide
in a lease the purposes for which the leased property
may be used. The authorities are all to the t•ffect that
the owner of property may lawfully make such provision
in a lease. Thus it is said in 51 C..J.S., page 10:2:2, N<>c.
337 that:
"Express conditions or covenants are frequently e1nbodied in leases to the effect that the
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pren1ises shall be used only for purposes specified
therein, and it is within the power of the parties
to n1ake valid and binding restrictions."
A nurnber of cases are cited in support of and which
do support the text. The sante doctrine is thus expressed
in 115 A.L.R. page 207, in this language :
"Generally speaking a landlord who is under
a duty to exercise due diligence to relet premises
in order to mitigate the damages as to a tenant
who lias breached his lease is not required to alter
the length o.f the lease term to the new tenant,
renting for different uses than those provided in
the original lease and the like. However such
diligence is required as would be exercised by a
reasonably prudent n1an under sin1ilar circumstances."
So also is the great weight of authority to the effect
that a landlord is under no duty to seek a new tenant.
The law is thus expressed in -10 A.L.R.190:
"In all but two jurisdictions in 'vhich the
question has been passed on, the Courts have
adopted the view that a landlord is under no duty
to seek a new tenant."
We have examined a number of cases there cited
from various jurisdictions and the same support the text.
No useful purpose will be served by reviewing such cases
because here the landlord did seek to secure a tenant and
upon finding one who was satisfactory, a new lease was
executed and plaintiff is merely seeking rent from the
defendant up to the time the new tenant began paying
rent. The rule generally followed by the Courts is thus
28
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expressed in the case of Philli}Jc'>·-Il ollman, Inc. v. Pcerle;.;s
Stage, Inc., 291 Pac. 178, where it j ~ held that:
"The rule is well settled that where a lease
has been repudiated hy the tenant and the prenlises abandoned and there are no covenants in the
lease to the contrary the landlord has a choice of
but two reinedies:
1.

He 1nay rest upon his contract and sue for
each installment of rent as it falls due. If
this alternative be selected obviously the action must be limited to accrued installments,
and no recovery can be had for future installments because the lease being still in existence
and no obligation to pay the rent until each
installments falls due.

2.

He may take possession of the premises, relet
the same and recover from the tenant any
damage suffered therehy."
·

In this case, plaintiff has adopted the first option and
as will be seen from the complaint, together with the
amended and supplemental complaint, plaintiff is not
seeking to recover for any rental or damages that it may
sustain after the new tenant began paying rent.
Further as to that: In the Court below, the defendant made the contention that the plaintiff was obligated
to accept the offers n1ade by Martha Washington Candy,
Bradley-Badger and Acousticon of Southern Illinois (See
Defendant's Exhibits 4, 2 and 3, which are attached to the
deposition of C. Francis Solomon, .Jr.). Those are the
only offers to lease that even approach the terms of the
lease between the plaintiff and defendant. The record
29
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fails to show any written offer whatsoever by the "\Vestern Pacific Railroad Cmnpany to enter into a lease agreernent with the plaintiff and the talk that was had about a
lease never rnaterialized in an offer ( Tr. 25). ':rhe offer
made by Wallace Tmna acting under the name of 'Vally's
Flowers is attached to the deposition of :Mr. Solmnon and
is marked Exhibit D-6. It will be observed that nothing
is said in the offer about subletitng the property. It
also includes some property, the anwunt not specified,
on Richards Street. It will be further noted that water
is to be furnished by the owner, together with sorne structural repairs and plurnbing. The plaintiff had doubts
about the financial responsibility of :Mr. Tmna, and it "·ill
be noted that unlike the lease to the defendant there was
no possibility of getting a larger rental from the premises
than the $400.00 per rnonth. Obviously the plaintiff could
not be required to accept such a lessee.
Under the offer of :Martha \Vashington, et al, the
defendant was to pay the cost of remodeling the premises
which was estirnated at $4000.00 (Tr. 29). The defendant
had employed Mr. Solomon, a real estate broker, to secure a lessee and the evidence shows that real estate
brokers charge 5% of the amount of rent payable under
the lease as a cornmission for services rendered in securing the lease. Thus, it is apparent that the defendant
would have been cmnpelled to pay substantially the same
amount if plaintiff had accepted the offers of -Martha
Washington, et al as defendant will be required to pay if
the claim of the plaintiff is satisfied, that is to say, plaintiff claims that there is owing to it by the defendant
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$3870.00 in rental. No claim is 1nade for remodeling the
premises. ~rhe defendant contends that the plaintiff
should have accepted the three offers of :Martha \Vashington Candy Co., et al in which event the defendant
would have become obligated to pay an estimated $4000.00
for the remodeling of the premises. If the plaintiff had
agreed to accept the lease of the three offers the defendand would also have been obligated to pay Mr. Solomon,
as it is the plaintiff has been compelled to pay :Mr. Solomon and the defendant has been relieved from such obligation. vVhile the trial court allowed an attorney's fee of
$300.00 and damages in the sum of $300.00, the costs of remodeling may or may not have cost the additional $600.00.
In any event, the non-complying defendant foreign corporation certainly cannot be heard to complain because the
plaintiff did not see fit to aceept the three leases of
:Martha \Vashington Candy Co., et al, when it well sustained no substantial, if any, lo:-;s because of such failure
of the plaintiff to accept the offers of _l\Iartha \Vashington Candy Co., et al. Plaintiff further directs the attention of the court to the provisions of U.C.A. 1953 16-8-3
whereby the defendant corporation is denied the benefits
of the laws of this state relating to corporations which
would semn to deny it the right of appeal.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR $600.00 AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
IN THIS ACTION.
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At the trial it was stipulated that the court below
111ight fix the auwunt of attorney's fees to be awarded as
and for the prosecution of this action. ':rhe court fixed
the amount of $300.00 (R. 164). Doubtless the trial court
would have awarded an additional fee if it had awarded
the amount of judgment to which the plaintiff is entitled.
In any event we submit in light of the fact that plaintiff
has been compelled to prosecute this appeal, the sun1 of
$300.00 is wholly inadequate, and we submit that this
court should increase the sarne to $1000.00, the amount
prayed or remand the case to the court below with directions to award an attorney's fee commensurate with the
services rendered in the trial court and on this appeal.
We submit that this court should direct the court
below to award plaintiff the judgment prayed for and for
costs of this appeal.
Respectfully subrnitted,

CLARENCE M. BECK,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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